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Nature of the Threat 
 Despite their official classification as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), biological 
weapons (BW) are perceived as less dangerous than other WMDs and given less attention in 
international policy spheres. Nuclear and missile technology present a continued danger and 
therefore are highly prioritized by policymakers. BW, on the other hand, are rarely discussed on 
the international stage. Nevertheless, peaceful, modern biotechnology continues to improve 
capabilities that can be key for everything from medical treatments to agricultural crop yield, but 
can be misused for malicious activities. To address the delicate balance between peaceful and 
malicious use, BW should be given higher attention in arms control. Furthermore, as pathogens 
are living things, they can naturally evolve to evade defenses. Regardless, the nature of the modern 
threat of BW itself continues to change. Biothreats can be natural or manmade and stem from 
various backgrounds or intentions, broadening their danger and difficulty to control. The primary 
focus of this paper revolves around the dangers of intentional use of BW. 
 Since the 2014 invasion of Crimea, Russia has developed new warfare techniques that have 
been described as “asymmetric war,” “hybrid war,” and “gray zone conflict.”1 The exact term used 
has been highly debated as scholars struggle to classify Russian actions, such as the 2015 cyber 
attack on the Ukrainian power grid or ongoing disinformation campaigns in the West.2 While the 
lack of clear terminology may be worrisome, the debate underlines the trend towards incorporating 
various strategies, which could involve BW. Unlike nuclear weapons, BW have a range of 
consequences and can be lethal or incapacitating, but their use does not cause physical destruction. 
Because of this, it is feasible they could be deployed in a hybrid-war situation to gain the advantage 
before an offensive, weaken an enemy’s defenses, or otherwise accomplish broad operational 
goals. Furthermore, Russia has shown great propensity for ignoring international law, as can be 
seen through their chemical attacks on political or state enemies such as Alexei Navalny and Sergei 
 
1 Ben Connable et al., “Russia’s Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against,” in Russia’s 
Hostile Measures: Combating Russian Gray Zone Aggression Against (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2020), pp. 5-8. 
2 Andrew Radin, Alyssa Demus, and Krystyna Marcinek, “Understanding Russian Subversion: Patterns, Threats, 
and Responses,” 2020, https://doi.org/10.7249/pe331. 
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Skripal.3 With an ongoing war in Ukraine, NATO must consider the potential threat of BW and 




What are Biological Weapons? 
 BW are a category of weapons including pathogens, toxins, and bioregulators that are used 
with the intention of causing mass illness or fatalities. Pathogens are viruses and bacteria, living 
microorganisms that are capable of replicating on their own and therefore spread self-sufficiently. 
These microorganisms are commonplace in everyday life and can cause minor illnesses such as 
the common cold and food poisoning or more extreme illnesses such as Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and meningitis. Viruses function by invading a cell and 
hijacking cellular function, using them as a host to replicate and spread. Bacteria, on the other 
hand, can hijack cells or replicate within the body to prevent normal function. In both cases, 
pathogens create sickness by preventing cells from carrying out their necessary duties or killing 
them. Pathogens cannot immediately cause sickness, but require hours to days to replicate and 
grow, known as the incubation period. Moreover, the strength of any pathogen determines how 
transmissible it is, or how easily it spreads. Infectious diseases caused by pathogens occur naturally 
and can cause overwhelming illness or death, but BW are specially engineered to alter 
characteristics impacting transmissibility, symptoms caused, and resistance to immunity or 
medical countermeasures.4 
While pathogens are living organisms that invade cells to cause illness, toxins and 
bioregulators are molecules that impact function through other means. Toxins are organic 
compounds found naturally in a wide range of living things from fungi to plants to venom-
 
3 Dany Shoham, “Russia's Toxic Legacy,” BESA Center Perspectives Paper, no. 792 (April 10, 2018). 
4 Gregory D. Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
 7 
producing animals. Toxins act as poisons with a range of capabilities such as damaging the cell 
and its DNA or inhibiting essential proteins and hormones. The effects of this damage quickly 
attack the nervous and cardiac systems, making them highly lethal. Ricin, a toxin isolated from the 
castor bean, is a well-known toxin that kills targets within days by prohibiting cells from making 
proteins. Furthermore, there aren’t medical countermeasures available to treat ricin poisoning, 
increasing its lethality.5 
Bioregulators encompass a category of molecules found naturally in the body that regulate 
blood pressure, heart rate, temperature, immunity, mood, sleep, and more. These chemicals are 
vital to maintaining biological equilibrium, but their presence in excess concentration can 
overwhelm normal body function, making them ideal weapons. For example, bradykinin is a 
protein used to lower blood pressure, but in excess, can cause severe inflammation that can block 
the airway and cause respiratory distress.6 Both toxins and bioregulators are not self-replicating 
and cannot spread through infectious means. Regardless, their more immediate effects on a target 
increase their relevance as BW.7 
 Pathogens, toxins, and bioregulators all occur naturally, but can be classified as BW based 
on purposeful dissemination with the intention to cause harm. Many BW programs focus intensely 
on methods of dispersing an agent, which has driven research on bomblets and aerosols. Bomblets 
serve as a point source, releasing a BW at a precise location to target the surrounding region. 
Aerosols release powdered biological agents through sprayers, covering a broad, indiscriminate 
region where individuals may encounter and inhale them. Aerosolization has a higher transmission 
rate than bomblets from breathing in the agent as a powder. Aerosolized weapons also are more 
discrete, as they release inconspicuous powders and therefore are difficult to identify without 
advanced sensing technology. However, BW are sensitive to environmental factors such as 
 
5 Joseph Pizzorno, “How Toxins Cause Disease,” Institute for Natural Medicine, January 14, 2021, 
https://naturemed.org/how-toxins-cause-disease/. 
6 Slavko Bokan and Zvonko Orahovec, “An Evaluation of Bioregulators/Modulators as Terrorism and Warfare 
Agents,” Technology for Combating WMD Terrorism, 2004, pp. 29-40, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-2683-
6_3. 
7 Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Body’s Own Bioweapons,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64, no. 1 (2008): pp. 16-23, 
https://doi.org/10.2968/064001006. 
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humidity or ultraviolet (UV) radiation that damage them while airborne, challenging their 
functionality as weapons.8 
How are Biological Weapons Developed? 
BW present an interesting dilemma as rapid advances in biotechnology and their application 
to civil society are inherently tied to BW development. This problem arises because the 
foundational research and basic tools or methods for peaceful and military applications are 
identical. For instance, CRISPR/Cas99 is a modern gene editing system that can insert novel pieces 
of DNA into existing systems. This capability is vital in modern biotechnology, especially in 
pharmaceutical or agricultural contexts, to therapeutically address genetic disorders, create 
genetically modified plants to increase crop yield, and more.10 The same tools can be used to invent 
BW if applied to a military context. As science continues to advance, it is likely that this dual-use 
technology will increase the opportunity for misuse.  
Unlike other WMDs, regulating and tracking BW development proves difficult because of the 
wide availability of dual-use technology and equipment. Nuclear and chemical weapons both 
require large industrial facilities, making it possible to identify them using aerial surveillance and 
intelligence. BW, on the other hand, can be developed in a standard laboratory, such as those found 
at universities and biotechnology companies. The only difference between peaceful and dangerous 
research is intent, covering malicious actions under the guise of civilian work. Without differences 
in materials and methods, it can be difficult to determine motive for usage based on just the tools.  
Moreover, movements to socialize access to science education open dual-use technology 
equipment and lab space to the public with little to no oversight.11  
 Modern biotechnology provides solutions to many longstanding issues that limited the 
effectiveness of BW. For example, using genetic engineering, scientists have invented chimera 
 
8 Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security, pp. 16-17. 
9 CRISPR stands for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats, a small piece of DNA that marks a 
cut site on target DNA, while Cas9 refers to a bacterial protein used to cut the target DNA. 
10 Muhammad Jamal, The CRISPR/Cas System: Emerging Technology and Application (Norfolk: UK, 2017). 
11 Erik Frinking et al., “The Increasing Threat of Biological Weapons: Handle with Sufficient and Proportionate 
Care” (The Hague, Netherlands: SIPRI, 2016), pp. 11-13. 
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pathogens. Chimera pathogens are pathogens that combine elements of various dangerous agents, 
provide antibiotic resistance, or produce lethal toxins after infection. These features allow an actor 
to edit a BW so that the body’s natural defenses may be insufficient, increasing the likelihood of 
a successful attack. A longstanding concern over how to practically carry out a BW attack has 
revolved around uncertainty with environmental conditions as pathogens degrade quickly 
depending on weather. Biotechnology can now cover an agent with a microcapsule to protect the 
pathogen, solving the weather issue. While these scientific advancements have not been tested for 
their strategic or tactical abilities, the potential applications suggest biothreats will only increase 
in the future as BW become more lethal and operationally useful.12 
What is Biodefense? 
 Biodefense aims to minimize the dangers posed by a biological event, whether naturally 
occurring or manmade. Defense strategies involve measures such as developing antibiotics, 
vaccines, and treatments or detecting the presence of dangerous pathogens using sensors and 
public health tools.13 The goal of biodefense is to protect those who have been in contact with a 
potential threat while containing the threat and preventing further exposure. Through the COVID-
19 pandemic, more attention has been brought to simple biodefense measures such as wearing a 
mask or quarantining sick or exposed individuals. Historically, the development of vaccines or 
treatments has taken years after the emergence of a threat, minimizing the practicality of relying 
on medical countermeasures. However, COVID-19 has shifted this thinking and demonstrated 
faster turnaround between development and deployment of these responses, though they are still 
generally too slow to rely on in lieu of public health measures. Overall, the pandemic has 
highlighted the importance of early detection of and preparing for biothreats, underscoring the 
reform needed for a sustainable biodefense strategy.   
 
 
12 Francisco Galamas, “Biological Weapons, Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence: The Biotechnology Revolution,” 
Comparative Strategy 27, no. 4 (2008): pp. 315-323, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495930802358364. 
13 Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security. 
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Literature Review 
Despite the growing threat of BW and spread of related technology globally, very little 
work regarding security implications in Europe specifically exists. Furthermore, the current debate 
over BW primarily addresses the role and failures of diplomacy in biological arms control. Before 
evaluating the threat BW pose to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is important 
to first gain a stronger grasp of security issues as they relate to BW. Below, I discuss three elements 
of biological security, including the biological security dilemma, classification of BW as WMD, 
and the use of force regarding BW.  
The Biological Security Dilemma 
 Realism accepts the core tenet that the international system is inherently anarchic without 
a higher power to enforce international law or oversee cooperation. As such, the purpose of the 
state is to ensure its survival, which in an anarchic system leads to security-seeking behavior.14 
The security dilemma emerges from this behavior, as each state assumes its enemies are seeking 
security through means that inherently endanger the first state’s survival.15 This spiral arises with 
all types of force ranging from conventional to nuclear weapons. However, BW change the balance 
due to the inability to judge intentions of biodefense research and secrecy surrounding them. 
In his book Biosecurity Dilemmas, health security expert Christian Enemark remarks that 
BW are not in essence weapons and, “it is unhelpful to think of a state as possessing BW and more 
accurate to think of it as being in a position to threaten or perpetrate a biological attack.”  
Expanding on this thought, he argues that BW cannot be obtained in the traditional sense because 
they are not a physical weapon to be wielded, but a system of scientific advancements that 
produces a threat when states weaponize their technology. As biotechnology spreads around the 
world, the number of states with access to BW technology increases, putting more states in a 
position to threaten others with BW. In a realist international system, states cannot control the 
 
14 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Man, the State and War: a Theoretical Analysis. (Fourth Printing.) (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1965). 
15 John J. Mearsheimer, “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power,” in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, 
NY: W.W. Norton, 2014), pp. 29-54. 
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usage of BW, leaving them uncertain of others’ intentions and encouraging security-seeking 
behavior.  
Modern biotechnology shrinks the gap between offensive, defensive, and civilian research 
into systems with the potential to be weaponized, leaving intentions as the only indicator to the 
true goal of such research. Although states could increase security through understanding a 
potential enemy’s intentions, intense secrecy prevents any attempts to minimize the security 
dilemma. Gregory Koblentz, a professor of biodefense, discusses the role of secrecy in protecting 
a state developing BW versus the ability of distorting outsiders’ decisionmaking. States seeking 
BW rely on secrecy to protect their capabilities and minimize vulnerability to an outside attack. In 
terms of the security dilemma, the weapons-seeking state attempts to gain the upper hand by 
developing a weapons capability their enemies do not have and cannot defend against, supporting 
their goal of regime survival through military superiority. However, intense secrecy leaves outsider 
states unable to predict and prepare for a military threat. In turn, threatened states strengthen 
defenses or arm against their enemy. In the cycle of the security dilemma, the outsider state 
validates a weapons-seeking state’s quest to arm against the potential adversary. While this pattern 
remains true for many weapons systems, Koblentz argues that BW excessively damage the 
international security dilemma because of normative, diplomatic, and strategic restraints 
necessitating secrecy. Strategic concerns are remarkable in the security dilemma context. 
Depending on the agent used, BW can feasibly be defended against with public health or medical 
countermeasures. To ensure a biological attack succeeds, states must deny their adversaries the 
ability to defend against an attack. Regimes of secrecy emerge and pose a significant threat to 
international security when compounded with the security dilemma. 16  
Searching for a solution to minimize the security dilemma, BW expert Jonathan Tucker 
adapts the premise of the security dilemma to fit what he calls the “Vicious Circle.” In his cycle, 
Tucker explains how fear of a bioterror or broader BW attack heightens threat assessment activities 
 
16 Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security. 
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that appear offensive to states on the outside. Without any evidence that a state researching BW 
has peaceful or defensive motivations, outside states begin to conduct threat assessments of their 
own and inevitably feel weak relative to the original state, leading to decisions to increase BW 
capabilities, offensive or defensive. This decision completes the circle as the original state 
recognizes greater danger from others and questions its relative strength once again. Tucker 
highlights the connections between this cycle, biological arms races, and self-fulfilling prophecies. 
To avoid the cycle, he argues for broader transparency and limited biodefense efforts, but these 
goals contradict the reality demonstrated by other authors that biotechnological advancement and 
secrecy are inherently tied to BW.17 
Classification of Biological Weapons as Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Despite their frequent categorization as a weapon of mass destruction, BW are unique and 
do not neatly fall into the same group as nuclear weapons, confusing strategy and security issues 
surrounding their development. In his “Defining ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction,’ Seth Carus 
breaks down the extensive history behind the ambiguous term “WMD.” Carus identifies multiple 
groups of the term with varying degrees of inclusion, leading some to suggest WMDs include 
chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, or other highly explosive weapons while others include 
any tool capable of causing significant destruction or distraction, such as cyberweapons. Contrary 
to this broad interpretation, limited definitions may just call nuclear or radiological weapons 
WMDs. The existence of the debate itself exposes the difficulty in grouping BW with others, as 
they are inherently different from the other weapons on the basis of their nature as living organisms 
and biological materials. Unlike conventional or nuclear weapons, BW do not cause physical 
destruction, but rather attack the body itself. For this reason, experts have proposed the term 
“weapon of mass casualty” to better appreciate the threat to humans as opposed to infrastructure.18 
 
17 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment: Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?,” Arms Control Today 
34, no. 8 (October 2004): pp. 13-19. 
18 W. Seth Carus, Defining "Weapons of Mass Destruction" (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, National Defense University, 2012). 
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 The debate over terminology is further complicated when considering both BW and 
chemical weapons (CW). Many have previously tied the two weapons systems under the term 
“chem-bio” because of their similar lack of physical destruction and focus on biochemical 
properties. However, even this term avoids the vital significance BW provide for security. 
According to Koblentz, the danger of BW arises from their vast biological diversity, ability to 
naturally replicate, and applied technology, differentiating them from CW.19 CW are exclusively 
molecules used to quickly intoxicate or kill a person, but are unable to replicate like BW. Unlike 
weapons that cause physical destruction, BW represent a broad category of specific threats with 
some causing lethal disease, others causing minor ailments, and still more capable of merely 
incapacitating individuals. Moreover, the mechanisms of how each different agent acts determines 
the defenses against it, so diverse agents make it difficult to defend against any one specific threat. 
Because of their ability to replicate, BW do not represent a single incident or threat, but rather an 
exponentially growing public health crisis. Finally, their development sets them apart from their 
chemical, radiological, or nuclear counterparts. Koblentz cites a United Nations study from 1969 
that prices the death of one person due to a BW at $1, while chemical and nuclear weapons cost 
$600 per death.20 The stark difference in cost arises due to the nature of multiuse technology, 
demonstrating that BW development does not fit neatly with other WMDs.  
 Considering blurry definitions separating weapons categories, especially BW and CW, 
academic Christopher Chyba presents WMDs as a continuum based on the potential for and 
success of nonproliferation efforts. The spectrum ranges from nuclear weapons, whose 
nonproliferation measures benefit from relatively easy verification methods and deterrent power, 
to cyber, which remains a complex puzzle for nonproliferation. BW and CW fall in the middle 
because controls against them exist, although Chyba presents CW as more similar to nuclear 
weapons and BW to cyber. Dual-use technology favors the proliferation of both, but the 
international community appears more dedicated to protecting against CW, leaving BW to 
 
19 Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security, pp. 5.  
20 Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security, pp. 25., 
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resemble cyber issues because of the difficulty to dampen an emerging threat. While Chyba’s scale 
appears sensible, the terminology issue persists without international consensus, slowing progress 
for greater security issues.21  
Use of Force 
As follows with debates regarding simply naming a weapon, the use and strategic value of 
BW is hotly contested, especially regarding their deterrent capability. Deterrence intends to 
prevent another state from acting in a particular way using the overt threat of certain punishment. 
In “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” 
Koblentz argues BW cannot serve as a deterrent because they cannot ensure success and take too 
long to cause harm. The effectiveness of any BW is determined by atmospheric and environmental 
conditions. The agent must then be taken into the body to act, leaving an unpredictable outcome. 
Additionally, adversaries may be able to defend against an attack, as deterrence requires a clear 
threat that then leaves the attacker vulnerable if the enemy can respond before the use of force.22 
Nonproliferation analyst Francisco Galamas refutes the longstanding agreement that BW 
cannot act as a deterrent. Galamas considers modern biotechnology to demonstrate how science 
has solved many of the practical issues with using a BW. For example, biotech now can design 
pathogens that are antibiotic or vaccine resistant, reducing the effect of preemptive or prophylactic 
biodefense. Scientists can also edit a pathogen’s genes to produce a protective coating that negates 
the risk of damage by atmospheric conditions. Finally, BW can be manipulated to be more virulent 
or lethal. Galamas argues that these scientific advances create a sense of certainty that a biological 
attack will cause harm; therefore, BW can act as a successful deterrent.23 
History of Use of Biological Weapons 
Ancient Usage 
 
21 Christopher F. Chyba, “Toward Biological Security,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (2002): pp. 122-136, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/20033167. 
22 Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” 
International Security 28, no. 3 (2004): pp. 84-122, https://doi.org/10.1162/016228803773100. 
23 Galamas, “Biological Weapons, Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence: The Biotechnology Revolution.” 
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 While modern biotechnology has pushed the development of WMDs in a new direction, 
BW are not a new tool. The concept of using natural disease and pestilence against an enemy has 
existed for hundreds of years without an understanding of germs and how they spread. Instead, 
historical bio-weaponeers poisoned food and water sources or used ill individuals themselves to 
carry disease to the enemy. For example, a European nomadic tribe from the times of ancient 
Greece dipped arrows into a mixture of rotten snakes and old, human blood before launching them 
towards an enemy to spread sickness. When attacking fortified cities, the Mongols allegedly 
catapulted the bodies of those who had died from disease into the city to infect the populous and 
weaken their ability to defend against an impending attack; this strategy did not result in military 
victory, but did effectively spread the plague. Similar attempts to spread disease involved sending 
sick individuals into enemy ranks to spread disease. Despite the lack of understanding of how 
infectious disease spreads, historical use demonstrates BW’s relevance as a strategic weapon to 
gain an advantage. With their usage, however, BW acquired a stigma as dirty and unethical tools 
of war. 24 
Early History (1900-1945) 
 In the 19th century, scientists discovered the causal relationship between germs and 
sickness, revolutionizing medicine, sanitation, and public health. Early on, most research sought 
to develop vaccines for naturally occurring diseases. Alternatively, public health experts 
implemented new hygiene and sanitation standards to minimize the spread of germs. During World 
War I (WWI), scientists devised the idea of applying new microbiological techniques to war when 
German military planners decided to infect enemy livestock and cavalry horses.25 This level of 
biological warfare continued in the ensuing decades, primarily dominated by Japanese research 
and use of BW against the Chinese in the years before World War II (WWII).26 Japanese weapons 
 
24 W. Seth Carus. A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21st Century, Center for the Study 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional Paper 12. (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2017), 
pp. 3-6. 
25 Edward M. Spiers, “Sabotage with Biological Weapons,” in Agents of War: a History of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons (London, UK: Reaktion Books, 2021), pp. 45-46. 
26 Carus, A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21st Century, 15-19. 
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used basic methods to disseminate biological agents, such as dropping plague-carrying fleas or 
contaminated food from planes over China, but were somewhat successful nonetheless. Hallmarks 
of this era highlighted the growing understanding of pathogens as new agents were discovered, 
isolated, and tested for use, spurring the development of modern BW once paired with 
advancements in industrial production.  
Modern (1945-present) 
 In recent history, BW are less relevant for state use and proliferation concerns, but have 
posed an increased threat for use by terrorist organizations or other nonstate actors. Many BW-
seeking states abandoned offensive programs with the rise of nuclear weapons. The primary case 
of state-level BW proliferation involved Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s, who developed a wide range 
of weapons for protection and deterrence until they could acquire a nuclear weapon. As discussed, 
modern technology enables the production of BW to go unnoticed by verification regimes and 
lowers the barrier of access, allowing anyone with access to a lab and microbiology expertise to 
produce a weapon. Theoretically, the relative ease of obtaining BW over other WMD makes them 
an ideal target for nonstate actors with limited resources. BW further prove promising for terrorist 
organizations due to their ability to indiscriminately cause mass casualty events. In practice, it has 
been exceedingly difficult for terrorists to develop, produce, and effectively weaponize such 
agents, with only one major incident occurring in the US.27 
 The most successful instance of bioterrorism was not carried out by a known nonstate actor 
or terrorist organization, but by an American microbiologist, Dr. Bruce Ivins. Immediately 
following 9/11, a US Army scientist mailed seven envelopes filled with high-quality B. anthracis28 
spores, leading to five deaths and 22 cases of anthrax.29 Potential motive for the attack may have 
been to bring legitimacy and urgency to his work developing an anthrax vaccine, with little 
 
27 Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security, 200-227. 
28 B. anthracis is the bacteria responsible for anthrax, a set of diseases that impact both humans and livestock and 
can attack the skin, gastrointestinal system, or pulmonary system. 
29 René Pita and Rohan Gunaratna, “Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: From World War I to the Amerithrax 
Investigation,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no. 1 (2009): pp. 82-87, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850600903143304. 
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evidence suggesting he intended to cause general panic as would be expected of a terrorist attack. 
The so-called Amerithrax attacks, named by the FBI, do not represent a great biological terrorism 
threat. The scientist responsible was an expert specializing on B. anthracis and had access to 
superior tools and materials, as well as necessary technical expertise. Moreover, the attack was not 
on the general population and did not require advanced dissemination techniques. Overall, the 
Amerithrax case highlights the level of expertise needed to create a successful weapon; 
simultaneously, however, the incident suggests even a minor attack can cause significant damage 
between the loss of life, the ensuing $6 billion in clean-up and investigation efforts, and heightened 
public fear of BW.30 
In stark comparison, numerous nonstate actors around the world have sought to develop 
BW without success. A cult in the city of The Dalles, Oregon, called the Rajneeshees, attempted 
to contaminate salad bars with Salmonella in 1984, hoping to suppress voter turnout by infecting 
citizens.31 Though over 700 Oregonians were sickened in the incident, the overall effect of the 
attack was minimal. In the 1990s, the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo sought to develop 
a BW to employ against nonbelievers but was unable to overcome technical difficulties.32 The cult 
attempted multiple BW attacks using poorly prepared agents that were not of weapons-grade 
quality or were unfit for large use because of how the pathogen was prepared. Aum eventually 
resorted to the CW sarin for a successful attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. Finally, al Qaeda 
prepared two laboratories to work with B. anthracis and botulinum toxin33 beginning in 1999, but 
the program was cut short by the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.34 Even without US 
intervention, it appears the group would not have succeeded in developing weapons because of 
limited technical expertise. The underlying importance of these three instances suggests that, while 
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BW may be colloquially termed the “poor man’s atomic bomb,” obtaining and using BW requires 
extensive resources, knowledge, and expertise, a high barrier for lone-wolf or terrorist attacks. 
 
International Responses to Biological Weapons 
 Limited controls exist to prevent the proliferation and use of BW. Normative behavior 
largely minimizes the risk of BW usage, but bad actors can still seek and acquire BW. Therefore, 
intelligence is key to understand the threat and prepare a proper response. Diplomatic controls 
should inherently depend on intelligence to ensure compliance. In the case of BW, however, 
intelligence largely fails to dig up evidence of BW development and production, weakening the 
existing diplomatic and normative controls.  
Norms Against Biological Weapons 
BW usage has been regulated through a combination of norms and legal obligations. As 
previously mentioned, BW have existed for thousands of years, though in less technical forms. 
However, their usage has remained rare despite scientific advances that produce larger quantities 
of more effective agents. Before the advent of modern BW or the scientific principles underlying 
them, humans were averse to the idea of poison and intentionally sickening others. Scholars have 
proposed the idea that humans are genetically averse to BW as an evolutionary mechanism to 
survive by avoiding dangerous substances.35 Historically, ancient India is the first place to have 
written record of prohibition of poisons, with the Hindu Laws of Manu from 500 BC banning 
Brahman warriors from using them.36 Natural rejection of poisons spanned different geographical 
regions, political structures, and religions, such as with the ban given from the first caliph, Abu-
Bakr, in 632 or the European Christian rejection during the medieval period.37 The widespread 
taboo against biological and chemical agents carried up to the 20th century, where modern 
biotechnology and warfighting won out over longstanding ethical objections. Contesting 
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diplomatic bans of BW and CW, a German representative explicitly advocated their usage as more 
humane, questioning whether modern biotechnology will enable actors to create superior weapons 
and therefore weaken restrictive norms.38 
Using Intelligence to Find Threats  
 While sufficient for other weapons, intelligence modalities like signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) cannot feasibly detect offensive use of biotechnology solely based on a state’s facilities 
or equipment. BW could be produced in a university lab, where they are unlikely to be discovered 
via intelligence. On the contrary, chemical and nuclear weapons require specialized facilities and 
storage visible from aerial surveillance. Intentions alone differentiate offensive, defensive, and 
civilian research, but dual-use technology provides a viable cover for many projects with the 
potential to create a weapon. BW storage and security equipment stand apart from standard 
laboratory equipment and could have served as a marker for offensive weapons production. 
However, as the biotech field grows, the lines between normal and excessive security blur. In 
theory, an ideal modality for collecting intelligence on BW would track equipment purchases and 
ensure its safe delivery and implementation, but this strategy remains impractical as scientific 
advances make laboratory materials broadly accessible. Even the pathogens themselves are more 
broadly available as genetic engineering allows a relatively amateur scientist to weaponize an 
otherwise mundane pathogen, circumventing monitored agents stored in microbiology banks and 
labs. Finally, the life science field continues to grow globally as biotech and pharmaceutical 
companies flourish, increasing the sheer volume of available information to search through to find 
malicious intent.  
Limited options exist for collecting intelligence on BW because of the nature of biological 
research, lack of identifiable markers, and regimes aiming to protect programs. Intensive secrecy 
employed to protect BW programs from outside scrutiny hinders SIGINT and denies information 
through communications. The small scale of BW and their relatively limited identifiable features 
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inhibit measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT). The remaining options for potential 
BW intelligence collection methods include open source intelligence (OSINT) and human 
intelligence (HUMINT). OSINT seeks to find publicly available information regarding what 
research is being conducted and draw conclusions about an actor’s intentions based on the 
direction of the research. Moreover, key capability goals become clear through published research. 
For instance, information about vaccine development suggests that the actor in question fears the 
spread of a specific pathogen. However, OSINT cannot provide information regarding an actor’s 
intentions. With states unlikely to publish work directly related to BW production, resulting 
intelligence only serves as an indicator of capabilities, not threats. 
The remaining option, HUMINT, represents the most successful intelligence method, as a 
source from a BW program can attest to both what capabilities are being developed and intentions. 
HUMINT proves how poorly other intelligence methods fare against BW. Intelligence services in 
the 1990s severely underestimated Russian and Iraqi capabilities and only realized the breadth and 
depth of their offensive programs when high-level defectors directed them to specific facilities. 
However, finding HUMINT sources of value remains difficult, especially considering how little 
information is available to hunt down a potential source and the unlikelihood of a perfectly placed 
source presenting themselves. Without HUMINT and based on limited support from other 
collection methods, BW face a chronic issue of insufficient evidence, allowing a proliferation 
threat to expand and present a valid risk before being caught. 
 The Soviet BW program provides a crucial case study to understand the failures of BW 
intelligence collection because of the long-term inability of Western intelligence services to find 
BW facilities and malicious research activities. During the Cold War, the US first learned of the 
surprisingly large BW industry in the Soviet Union from two WWII German military scientists, 
which served as the basis for the intelligence community’s analysis for decades.39 By the late 
 
39 Jeanne Guillemin, “The Soviet Biological Weapons Program,” in Biological Weapons: from the Invention of 
State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 
131-147. 
 21 
1950s, satellite imagery confirmed one facility described by the German sources. Additionally, 
OSINT played a significant role in early intelligence estimates by analyzing published scientific 
articles to identify Soviet goals and intentions. However, the resulting information frequently led 
analysts to underestimate the scope of the BW program based on the theory that the research 
constituted legitimate public health or veterinary research. 
In the 1980s, the CIA continued to find a few other facilities constructed after a 1972 
decision to expand the Soviet program, but failed to find clear evidence of any offensive programs. 
As a result, Western intelligence leaders dismissed the possibility of a BW threat. Without tangible 
proof, intelligence officials fostered a bias against the belief of Soviet BW, impeding in-depth 
analysis and attempts to view the issue impartially.40 Intelligence failed to uncover solid evidence 
until Vladimir Pasechnik, a Soviet bio-weaponeer, and Ken Alibek, deputy chief of the largest BW 
entity, defected to the US. Overall, Western intelligence services dramatically underestimated 
Soviet capabilities or intentions, largely because of intensive security and secrecy within the Soviet 
system itself. Applied to the modern context, the case study of Soviet BW demonstrates that the 
intelligence community could benefit from aggressive, up-to-date intelligence collection and 
systemic reform to minimize analysts’ bias. As dual-use technology further hinders the ability to 
track a potential threat, creative thinking will be necessary to successfully target and clarify details 
surrounding offensive BW. 
Diplomatic Measures 
Geneva Protocol and its Failures 
 The 1920s saw an increased interest in arms control and disarmament following the mass 
destruction of WWI, such as with the 1922 Washington Treaty’s limitations on naval power. Both 
BW and CW were similarly highlighted, though CW were considered a more pressing threat than 
BW. The Geneva Protocol emerged from the Convention for the Supervision of the International 
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Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War to specifically address CW and BW.41 
During WWI, CW were widely used and resulted in an estimated 1.3 million casualties.42 On the 
contrary, BW were generally used in small, tactical situations, such as the German use against 
livestock.43 As CW resulted in overwhelming casualty compared to BW, CW were the main focus 
of the debate. The original version of the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of “asphyxiating, 
poisonous, or other gases,” which introduced the debate over whether or not this description 
covered BW.44 At the Polish Delegation’s insistences, bacteriological weapons were included, 
introducing an official ban on the offensive use of BW. 
 While BW may have been formally banned, the Geneva Protocol left loopholes for 
continued research and development. Notably, the Geneva Protocol only banned the offensive use 
of BW, not their development, production, or stockpiling. Moreover, states expressed concerns 
over their ability to retaliate in kind should another state use an offensive BW against them. As a 
result, states were able to develop BW as a response. The vague approach was somewhat necessary 
to permit civilian research into medical countermeasures, but these efforts can be used as a cover 
for offensive weapons production, further complicating diplomatic goals. Without firm restrictions 
on both offensive and defensive programs, the Geneva Protocol essentially institutionalized a 
preexisting taboo against BW and CW. However, aversion to these agents had not prevented their 
use in WWI and similarly the Geneva Protocol did not prevent offensive usage or development 
during the interwar period, demonstrated through Japanese BW experimentation in the 1930s.45 
The Biological Weapons Convention and its Failures 
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In 1972, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 
informally referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), emerged and signaled a 
changing outlook for global arms control. States originally intended on negotiating an agreement 
for the prohibition of both BW and CW. Deciding it would be too difficult to combine the two 
categories, the British recommended continuing with just BW to salvage an agreement.46 Unlike 
previous agreements, the BWC became the first international agreement to completely outlaw an 
entire class of weapons, prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, or use of any 
biological agent or toxin and held states accountable for the destruction of existing stockpiles. In 
1975, the BWC entered the world stage with 22 countries agreeing to unequivocally prohibit BW. 
As of 2020, 183 countries have ratified or acceded to the Convention. Absent states include a 
handful of small countries like with no apparent interest in BW development Tuvalu and 
Micronesia, as well as Israel and North Korea, who both are suspected of developing BW. 
Furthermore, four states, including Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, and Syria, have signed but not ratified 
the treaty.47 
Despite broad public approval, the BWC exists as a mostly spineless agreement with no 
practical ability to enforce any involved statutes and therefore is riddled with issues. In addition to 
the ban itself, the agreement requires states to legislate in accordance with it, encourages sharing 
scientific knowledge, and supports cooperatively addressing violations. Not included, however, 
are any means of recognizing, verifying, or policing violations. As discussed, verification remains 
difficult with BW due to their reliance on dual-use technology, which easily avoids detection. At 
mandated five-year review conferences, states have lobbied for stronger oversight and verification, 
especially through the creation of the Ad Hoc Group in the 1990s to provide recommendations on 
strengthening compliance. However, these measures are insufficient when combined with Russian 
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noncompliance and other states’ intransigence. The US essentially ended the conversation 
regarding verification by pulling out of the talks and refusing to reconsider the issue. The BWC 
still does not contain any measures for verification or oversight and therefore has remained 
ineffective, though it does succeed in reaffirming norms against the use of BW.48 
The Australia Group and Resolution 1540 
The Australia Group (AG), formed in 1985, complements the BWC and now includes 43 states 
dedicated to synchronizing their export controls to support nonproliferation of BW and CW. The 
AG’s success is uncertain because the regulations are not universal. The group excludes major 
non-member states such as China and Russia, which can freely export dangerous materials and 
therefore undermine the AG.49 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 
similarly aims at preventing nonproliferation to terrorist organizations or other nonstate actors by 
requiring states to secure and strengthen export controls for WMD. Resolution 1540 benefits from 
its existence as a UNSC resolution, providing it broad powers and binding legality; however, it is 
controversial because the UNSC essentially dictated international law to all UN states though only 
15 states sit on the committee at a time. 50 
 
Where NATO Stands 
NATO Collective Security versus Individual States 
  At its core, NATO is a military alliance emerging from the Cold War, but has grown to 
encompass broader political support for states with similar values, blurring the lines between 
alliance and a political organization. NATO was established in 1949 with the goal of increasing 
security like a typical alliance. However, NATO expanded on the concept of a traditional alliance 
to organize formal institutions such as independent agencies and a multi-national military 
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structure, leading to it simultaneously acting as an international organization and a military 
alliance.51 As an alliance, NATO relies on individual states to approve and implement policies and 
provide resources and capabilities, which leads to varying interests. This key tenet sets the stage 
for mismatched efforts in regards to BW with a few states leading the majority of NATO’s 
programs and policies. Considering the contributions and capabilities of individual states can 
identify the resources available for NATO’s use.  
Contributions by Individual NATO States 
The United States 
 The US launched its BW program in 1942 after the attack at Pearl Harbor due to concerns 
of Japanese BW. In preceding years, Japan openly tested BW in China, alerting others to their 
biological capabilities. Beginning with 18 agents to develop, selected because of inherent lethality 
and transmission potential, the US focused primarily on B. anthracis and botulinum toxin as anti-
personnel agents.52 The US also continued research conducted by the British during the war to 
weaponize anthrax in a four-pound bomb and built facilities to mass produce these bombs.53 
However, they did not complete the pilot program or achieve operational capability before the war 
ended. Additionally, Americans tested new aerosol dissemination methods. After the war, the US 
developed advanced delivery systems such as bombs that could cover more than 25,000 square 
miles with an agent, highlighting their success in both development of agents and dissemination.54 
During this era of BW development, the US explored anticrop agents for use against China or 
Russia, demonstrating the depth of military strategy involved with the program.  
 In 1969, President Nixon announced the unilateral termination of the American offensive 
BW program.55 Though the US did not believe BW were useless weapons, they wanted to avoid 
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the political risk of maintaining an offensive program. Military planners found it difficult to justify 
keeping BW due to their minimal strategic deterrence value and ineffectiveness. Furthermore, 
American deployment of herbicides and tear gas in Vietnam was viewed internationally as a 
violation of the Geneva Protocol, leading to domestic and international criticism. By signaling 
interest in greater arms reduction through terminating the program, the US gained political capital 
to fuel the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks on nuclear weapons with the Soviets.56 Through 
abolishing the offensive program, Nixon achieved numerous political goals by relieving pressure 
on his administration and opening space to discuss disarmament of various without damaging the 
defensive BW program. Details on modern US defensive measures remain classified, but the 
program is assumed to be robust based on the thriving American biotech industry.  
The United Kingdom 
The UK began offensive research primarily on aerosolization and cluster munitions in 1940 
for use in WWII.57 They achieved operational capability, but did not employ a BW because they 
were highly inefficient and implausible for use during combat. By 1952, the program was 
considered unnecessary for military planning and phased out by 1957. In conjunction with British 
efforts, Canada explored multiple agents and conducted weapons tests from 1940-57.58 As of 2020, 
the UK is one of the primary global actors for biodefense due to history with weapons production 





 The French BW program officially spanned from 1921-1972, though with numerous 
interruptions. Unofficially, the program slowed down by 1956 when interest shifted to investing 
 
56 Revill, “'Muddling Through' in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,” pp. 391-393.  
57 Carus, A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21st Century, 37-38. 
58 Carus, A Short History of Biological Warfare: From Pre-History to the 21st Century, 29. 
59 “UK Biological Security Strategy,” (The Home Office, United Kingdom, 2018). 
 27 
more heavily in nuclear weapons. While active, the French focused on a range of pathogens and 
weaponization using grenades, artillery shells, and aircraft bombs with some success. Specifically, 
the French weaponized rinderpest, an anti-cattle disease with no human applications, indicating 
their intentions involved attacking cavalry or livestock.60 In recent years, French efforts focused 
on building large stockpiles of antibiotics and other medical countermeasures. They presumably 
conduct significant defensive research based on a review of state-sponsored biological institutes 
and in-depth biosafety and containment policies.  
Italy 
Italy operated a small program while considering the utility of BW when invading 
Abyssinia in 1936, though they ultimately rejected the idea.61 The program likely went 
underground at the outbreak of WWII. Modern Italian CBRN forces focus on civil defense of 
manmade threats and civil protection for both manmade and natural events. Both prongs of the 
Italian biodefense machinery are integrated with the army, fire brigades, and policymakers to 
ensure maximum control over emerging situations on a practical and policy level.62 
The Czech Republic 
 Czech expertise in poisonous weapons has been established repeatedly. Czechoslovakia 
provided significant support to Soviet BW efforts during the Cold War as a member of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization (WTO), NATO’s eastern counterpart. For example, Czechoslovak scientists 
recount conducting research projects as designated by the Soviets. Despite official claims that the 
work was purely defensive, infrastructure such as expensive aerosol testing chambers and a 
primate testing program indicate offensive weapons development.63 Following the Cold War, 
Czech BW and CW expertise persisted, first demonstrating their proficiency during the Gulf War 
in the 1990s. Czech chemical detection teams were deployed to scope out chemical threats, which 
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upon finding potential CW, would quickly act to don personal protective equipment (PPE). The 
rapid Czech response to finding a weapon demonstrates advanced preparedness and thorough 
action plans, especially compared to other countries such as the US who ignored Czech warnings 
of chemical threats.64 
 Building on longstanding specialization with CBW threats, the Czech Republic has taken 
on a vital role in NATO’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense 
through housing numerous defensive programs. In 2003, NATO launched its Multinational CBRN 
Defence Battalion under Czech leadership to improve reconnaissance, detection, and 
decontamination, especially in the realm of BW detection. Per a NATO press release, the group is 
responsive to active threats, with the ability to deploy within days, or can be integrated into specific 
missions.65 Moreover, the Czech Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces operates a Biological 
Defence Centre as a specialty hospital and research facility for dangerous pathogens, which 
contracts with NATO, though the exact work conducted is unclear.66 
Hungary 
In the lead up to WWII, Hungary launched a small, six-person effort to research pathogens 
of key concern such as B. anthracis, feared because of enemy work with these specific elements.67 
The program considered weaponizing agents, but likely did not produce a ready-for-use weapon. 
Following WWII, Hungarian scientists aided the Soviet program and attended conferences led by 
military health institutes through the WTO, but likely played a smaller role than Czechoslovakia. 
Despite limited Soviet-era programs, Hungary currently houses a National Office for Research and 
Technology that seeks to elevate Hungary as a primary actor in the biodefense industry through 
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fostering innovation and development of new technologies.68 Furthermore, in 2004, Hungary 
rolled out a mobile biological defense laboratory to counter fears of terrorist attacks at the 2004 
Summer Olympic Games in Athens through early detection and surveillance.69 
Poland 
Before WWII, Poland prepared a sabotage campaign for a potential Soviet invasion, which 
eventually was employed against thousands of German personnel in targeted attacks. The Polish 
resistance movement reported the use of BW against the Germans resulting in nearly 2000 cases 
of illness and 150 deaths in enemy troops, 680 horses infected with the equine infection glanders, 
17 towns with typhoid outbreaks, and food contamination on supply trains through their 
widespread scorched earth strategy.70 Throughout the Cold War, Polish institutes collaborated with 
the Soviets on basic research, with the most interesting instance involving producing radiation-
resistant microbes. This research could relate to Soviet interests in developing a weapon resistant 
to environmental conditions that would survive dissemination and remain capable of infecting 
targets. Poland remains involved in non-NATO European biodefense measures. As of recent, 
Polish preparedness has been on display through their use of the military to support the COVID-
19 response, especially with the deployment of chemical units to disinfect civilian and military 
infrastructure.71 
Germany 
The German Democratic Republic (GDR – East Germany) minimally provided to the 
Soviet BW effort as a member of the Soviet bloc, primarily sending fermenters needed to produce 
BW to the Soviet Union in a secretive manner. Following unification with West Germany at the 
end of the Cold War, the German biotech industry flourished, allowing for strong biodefense 
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programs. In 2013, Germany launched a large biosecurity program to counter manmade biological 
threats, primarily in Africa and Central Asia. Little is known about specific capabilities, but the 
program includes five institutes and outlines primary goals as surveillance, detection, biosafety, 
and more, indicating the strength of the German biodefense sector.72 
Related Member Projects Outside of NATO 
 The European Union (EU) is a political organization banding together 27 European 
countries, including 21 members of NATO. As many NATO members share membership in the 
EU, the defensive capabilities being developing for the EU provide insight into potential NATO 
preparations. The European Defense Agency (EDA) works to integrate EU countries’ defense 
policies, which frequently includes shared research initiatives. The EDA has recently undertaken 
a large project to bolster ‘testing and evaluation’ with regards to ‘biological detection, 
identification, and monitoring’ (T&E BioDIM).73 The project emerged from a report citing gaps 
in EDA policies and currently has two main focuses: to work towards better communication and 
cooperation between member states and to improve biological surveillance methods. Through the 
early phases of their work, the group has found a significant lapse in coordination that negatively 
affects the success of T&E efforts by increasing costs and decreasing efficiency as multiple states 
work towards similar objectives without effective communication. To streamline communication 
efforts and support burden-sharing, states intend on standardizing methods used for T&E by 
determining specific BW of concern and setting expectations for lab procedures and performance. 
Of the six countries involved, four are NATO states and include France, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands. A related effort aims to build a lab network to identify threats, with involved NATO 
countries including Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Poland. In January 2021, CBRN Surveillance as Service (SaaS), a project to heighten general 
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surveillance capabilities, launched in Croatia, Slovenia, and Hungary.74  Finally, the EDA 
introduced a competition to encourage innovation by incentivizing new ideas for autonomous 
surveillance technologies. From these recent examples, it becomes evident that the EDA focuses 
primarily on detecting potential threats and developing new technology or methods to do so more 
effectively. 
Involvement in International Agreements 
 NATO countries hold a variety of individual stances on BW and their control, but all 
members support international agreements targeting nonproliferation. All member states have 
ratified or acceded to the BWC, though their individual stances on implementation vary. For 
instance, the US strictly opposes verification efforts under the belief they are invasive enough to 
harm the biotech industry, but not invasive enough to root out potential threats.75 The EU officially 
reports interest in verification, though inaction by countries with large biotech industries, like 
Germany, questions their dedication. Without widespread agreement on international arms control 
measures, it is difficult to assess genuine interest in global nonproliferation. NATO countries seem 
focused on internal debates regarding the impact of verification regimes on their domestic policy 
and stray away from confrontational debate on the future of the BWC. Additionally, all states 
except two (Albania and North Macedonia) are party to the AG. While the reasoning behind these 
notable absences is unclear, gaining membership is challenging due to difficult-to-meet 
benchmarks and the role of intelligence sharing, as current members may shy away from sharing 
information with potential members.76 Though involvement in international measures appears 
promising that NATO retains interest in biological issues, it is important to remember that Russia 
launched a massive upgrade of their BW program in the 1970s after joining the BWC and has since 
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had questionable compliance. In other words, commitment to international treaties or groups has 
little bearing on the reality of a state’s position or dedication to BW control. 
Global Health Security Risk 
In 2019, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Johns Hopkins University (JHU) published a 
report, “Global Health Security Index: Building Collective Action and Accountability,” regarding 
biodefense, biosecurity, and overall preparedness to handle a biological threat. Based on 96 
qualitative questions examining commitment to international norms, early detection systems, 
response preparations, and more, the NTI and JHU report a score of 40.2 out of 100 as the average 
global preparedness to handle a biological threat.77 Correlated to the scale of least to most prepared, 
this figure suggests the world is ‘more prepared’ relative to the least prepared category. As of 
2019, the study stated that no country, including the US, was prepared to handle a biological crisis 
or pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic has likely changed preparedness, but regardless, the study 
emphasizes that weak systems that leave any country or bloc vulnerable to BW. Below, NATO 
countries’ overall scores have been tabulated using the index data, as well as the average score of 
NATO countries. The average for NATO falls at 58.4 out of 100, significantly higher than the 
global level, but still well below the most-prepared category applied to scores above 67.0. 
Considering the US’s failed response to the COVID-19 pandemic despite their significantly higher 
score (83.5 vs. 58.4), the index indicates that NATO will not be prepared to address a biological 
threat in the near future. The study also compares the commitment to improving national 
infrastructure and supporting norms. The top four countries listed are the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and France, highlighting ongoing efforts to bolster national capabilities and 
thereby NATO capabilities at large. 
 
Table 1. Level of preparedness of all NATO states individually and averaged. The average level of preparedness 
for NATO states is recorded as 58.4. Seven countries were marked as most-prepared to handle a biological threat, 
highlighted in yellow, while the remaining 23 fell into the more-prepared category in orange.78 
 
77 Michelle Nalabandian et al., “Global Health Security Index: Building Collective Action and Accountability” 
(Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019). 
 
78 Nalabandian et al., “Global Health Security Index: Building Collective Action and Accountability.” 
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State Level of Preparedness State Level of Preparedness 
Albania 52.9 Lithuania 55.0 
Belgium 61.0 Luxembourg 43.8 
Bulgaria 45.6 Montenegro 43.7 
Canada 75.3 Netherlands 75.6 
Croatia 53.3 North Macedonia 39.1 
Czech Republic 52.0 Norway 64.6 
Denmark 70.4 Poland 55.4 
Estonia 57.0 Portugal 60.3 
France 68.2 Romania 45.3 
Germany 66.0 Slovakia 47.9 
Greece 53.8 Slovenia 67.2 
Hungary 54.9 Spain 65.9 
Iceland 46.3 Turkey 52.4 
Italy 56.2 UK 77.9 
Latvia 62.9 US 83.5 
NATO Average 58.4 
 
Past Policies from NATO 
 Despite limited publicly available information, openly accessible documents indicate 
NATO’s consistent and continued concern regarding CBRN capabilities. For example, NATO 
state leaders issue a joint declaration after each summit that describes what was discussed and 
goals set, illustrating what issues NATO feels are most important at that time. In 1999, NATO 
members met for the Washington Summit and devised the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) 
in an attempt to build capabilities.79 The initiative listed 58 areas where NATO members did not 
meet capability obligations that could be necessary during a conflict, such as CBRN detection and 
protection. This conference was followed by the 2002 Prague Summit. The main concern reiterated 
in Prague was that NATO needed to be able to quickly deploy troops to respond to a conflict or 
threat where they could encounter CBRN weapons. In response, the Prague Capabilities 
Commitment (PCC) called for allies to improve individual and collective capabilities necessary to 
counter CBRN threats.80 Based on the fact that the PCC repeated the capability priorities listed 
 
79 “NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2001). 
80 “Prague Summit Declaration,” NATO Online Library, November 21, 2002, 
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two years earlier, combined with general failure to meet the DCI standards, BW defense 
capabilities likely were not advanced to a satisfactory level overall.  
 Responding to proliferation concerns and rapid scientific advancement, NATO released a 
Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and Defence against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats in 
2009. In this policy, NATO commits to an “active policy” countering the proliferation of WMD 
through dedication to existing arms control agreements, enhanced intelligence sharing, and 
building on nonproliferation efforts to slow the spread of CBRN weapons globally, especially to 
terrorist organizations. Deepening connections between the military alliance and political affairs, 
states express intent to contribute broader resources to support nonproliferation efforts, such as 
through sharing advisors or using transportation networks to track WMD materials proliferation. 
Noting the possibility of a CBRN attack on a NATO state if relations fail with an enemy, the policy 
dictates the importance of maintaining strategic weapons for deterrence and operational capability 
through an attack. To accomplish this, the Alliance reinforces the importance of improving 
intelligence and defenses across NATO states to spread expertise throughout alliance states. While 
the policy options outlined generalize WMD issues under one document, BW are explicitly named 
as a primary concern due to rapid advances in the life sciences. Nonetheless, specific biological 
defenses are not discussed in connection with NATO’s overarching strategy and threats primarily 
refer to terrorism concerns over state actors.81 
  
Inferences from NATO Documents 
 NATO publications do not necessarily include specific policy reports, but do frequently 
reference BW in the context of CBRN concerns, especially through official press releases 
stemming from NATO Summits. After a thorough review of summit publications, NATO appears 
 
81 “NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats,” 
NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats (2009). 
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cognizant of the threat of BW, but takes limited tangible action to address them. In conferences 
since 1999, 11 of 15 publications have broadly referenced counter-CBRN capabilities or 
initiatives. Most references include vaguely worded statements that NATO intends on improving 
defenses or countering the threat, but do not include explicit, achievable goals. Aside from these 
comments, little attention is given to BW or CBRN weapons as a group.  
 One potential reason for limited concern over BW would be their relatively minimal 
relevance in recent decades. NATO summit publications appear to be highly reactive to 
international trends and threats and therefore represent current events from that year. The most 
pressing BW threat to emerge in this period came from the previously discussed Amerithrax case 
in the US, but the situation was not generalized to represent the threat of BW by nonstate actors. 
Unlike BW, chemical and nuclear weapons both receive more attention in NATO publications, 
corresponding with a more pressing and prevalent threat.  
Following the 2018 poisoning of former-Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in the 
UK, CW gained standing in the 2018 Brussels Summit, boosting BW as well. NATO called for 
broad condemnation of CBRN use and universal acceptance of relevant nonproliferation treaties, 
including the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), CWC, and BWC.82 In 
this context, BW are considered primarily because of their grouping as a CBRN threat, not because 
of their specific danger. This represents the lack of consideration given to them as a class of 
weapon and relative attention given only as a broader, vague WMD threat. The 2014 Wales 
Summit, largely considered the key summit since the end of the Cold War, further compounds the 
Russian threat with the CBRN threat.83 This summit was held months after the covert Russian 
invasion of Ukraine, leading to significant condemnation from individual NATO members and the 
organization as a whole. As such, Eastern European issues received extra attention, but little 
evidence indicates revamped policy to better address concern of a Russian CBRN threat. 
 
82 “Brussels Summit Declaration,” Brussels Summit Declaration (NATO) July 11, 2018, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm. 
83 “Wales Summit Declaration,” Wales Summit Declaration, (NATO) September 5, 2014, 
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 The outcome of a review of summit documents demonstrates how BW are treated as an 
add-on and suggests little is being done to defend against biological threats. The minimal interest 
does still indicate some consideration of their danger. Considering summit documents overall, BW 
are receiving increased attention over time, especially with a reinvigorated focus on CBRN 
weapons since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Unclassified information available through NATO 
does not indicate any significant policy change or preparation has taken place. 
In 2020, NATO’s Office of Science and Technology (STO) published a report on 
technology trends and their potential influence on military capabilities, including a host of 
biological issues. Related to BW, the STO foresees growth in the synthetic biology and genetic 
engineering fields that will allow for faster identification of CBRN threats and rapid development 
of medical countermeasures. This advancement is considered in negative light due to the potential 
of new technology to, “increase casualties, reduce combat effectiveness, and present a strategic 
challenge to Alliance societies as a whole.”84 The document then lists synthetic biology and 
medical countermeasures as “high impact,” meaning they could alter capabilities and NATO 
strategy. Combining this information, it becomes clear that NATO recognizes a capability gap in 
science and technology and that they may be unprepared to respond to a threat or attack, presenting 
a significant vulnerability. 85 
In addition to the direct threat of biotech advancements, the STO’s analysis indirectly 
captures the potential for an entirely different face of war through their focus on exoskeleton suits 
and augmented soldier capabilities. Though these do not directly suggest a heightened BW threat, 
the document explicitly notes the role CW have played in driving innovation to enhance sensing 
abilities, or how concern over CBRN exposure has led to development of biosensors to track 
soldiers’ health as it relates to warfighting abilities. Through their focus on improving the 
warfighter’s physical state to continue combat in the face of CBRN threats, the STO recognizes 
 
84 “Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040” (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Science and Technology Organization, 
2020), p. 108. 
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shortfalls in current gear and sensing capabilities, but does not provide a solution nor task anyone 
to address them. Furthermore, the document notes the significant jump in investment in this realm, 
increasing from $68M USD to $1.8B USD between 2014 and 2025. Again, intensive spending on 
improving current gear indicates NATO’s interest in gaining operational advantages from new 
technology. 
Previous Statements from NATO Leaders  
In recent years, BW have gained new prominence in NATO leaders’ considerations, as can 
be seen through mention in speeches and public statements. Recently, Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) arms control expert Dr. Ian Anthony spoke at a NATO-sponsored 
event and referred to the “long term neglect of issues around biological weapons” as a significant 
threat surrounding WMD issues.86 This comment immediately follows NATO Deputy Secretary 
General Rose Gottemoeller’s statement pledging dedication to adapting the BWC where she 
admitted that more can be done to positively support regimes such as the BWC.  
Related to the Russian threat, Deputy Secretary General Gottemoeller spoke at the Kyiv 
Security Forum in 2018, an annual conference discussing Eastern European security, where she 
expressed the need for CBRN “resilience.” Acknowledging Ukraine’s familiarity with the issue, 
she conveys her discontent that CBRN weapons remain an unsolved issue despite numerous 
international measures to curtail their development. Furthermore, Gottemoeller targets Russia’s 
intransigence regarding international law as a key problem for NATO. She does not indicate 
NATO’s level of readiness or a need to change defensive strategies, but this statement proves the 
relevance of Russian actions in NATO’s ongoing security concerns, likely including BW.87 
 In December 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg spoke out regarding NATO 
preparedness for a BW based on the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Secretary General 
Stoltenberg emphasizes that while the pandemic was not manmade, the lagging response to contain 
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it demonstrates NATO’s lack of preparedness and need to build up its BW response capabilities. 
Interestingly, he mentions Article V, which calls for solidarity following an attack on one NATO 
state, to remind readers that NATO maintains a wide range of capabilities, including legal WMDs, 
and will utilize them as necessary in the face of an attack. Stoltenberg does not detail what changes 
must be made to prevent similar pandemics in the future but does advocate for reformed 
intelligence sharing within the Alliance.88 
NATO Groups and Task Forces 
 While difficult to glean a view into what actions NATO has taken to strengthen defenses 
against BW, the focus of NATO groups on CBRN defense indicates growing concern over BW 
threats, among others. NATO instated Science for Peace and Security in 1958 in response to the 
Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite the previous year with the goal of closing the technical gap 
between the Soviet bloc and NATO. Originally, the primary focus involved missile defense, but 
has shifted towards broader scientific dilemmas such as energy security, counterterrorism, cyber 
defense, and CBRN defense. Under CBRN defense, current areas of interest include sensing, 
surveillance, diagnostics, and medical countermeasures, connoting concern for biodefense 
capabilities.89 
 Another notable group is the Combined Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear Defence Task Force, which serves NATO as a specific group that can engage in armed 
conflict in the face of a CBRN threat. The task force equips NATO with special training in 
reconnaissance, sampling potential agents, and operations involving incident containment. 
Because they are capable of handling armed conflict and other emergencies, the Joint CBRN 
Defence Task Force enhances NATO’s preparedness to respond to an emerging biological crisis 
by supporting military and civilian prevention and decontamination efforts.90 On a broader level, 
NATO manages a NATO Response Force (NRF) to be deployed during peaceful operations and 
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national emergencies, which can supplement biological incident responses but does not specialize 
explicitly in BW crises.91 
 
NATO Crisis Management Case Studies 
The Skripal Poisoning 
Putting aside the differences in efficacy, mechanisms, and lethality, CW and how 
governments handle their threat can serve as an indicator to preparedness for a biological attack. 
Of particular interest, the 2018 poisoning of former Russian agent Sergei Skripal in the UK 
demonstrates the difficulty in containing and responding to a chemical or biological threat. Though 
the Russians deny involvement, evidence suggests Russian GRU agents poisoned Skripal and his 
daughter in an isolated attack. In 2020, the leader of the emergency unit responsible for hazardous 
situations, known as the National Ambulance Resilience Unit, Nick Spence presented post-mortem 
thoughts on the British efforts to contain the attack. Authorities were notified when two people, 
Skripal and his daughter, collapsed on a park bench. This was treated as a standard incident as 
there was no reason to suspect use of a CW. Only after the Skripals were treated in the hospital 
did emergency services learn that they had encountered the CW Novichok92, launching a wider 
effort to track down equipment used for the Skripals and exposed patients. Months later, a second 
incident occurred when two British nationals were accidentally poisoned after finding the disposed 
poison, leading to one death. The British response involved extensive decontamination, tracking 
efforts to find exposed individuals, and modifying protocol to be wary of further incidents. Based 
on the response, Spence highlights issues in the UK’s response, especially with communication, 
operations, and resources. Specifically, response teams were blocked from important information 
regarding the investigation that hindered their ability to fully respond. He also notes issues with 
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fueling a longer-term response and accessing supplies as the threat dragged on for months 
following the initial incident. 93 
 The British succeeded in limiting the breadth of the attack, but revealed potential 
weaknesses in a state’s response to a biological or chemical threat. Concerns revolved around 
sustaining the response and investigation, as well as failures in operational communication. The 
Skripal poisoning only involved the UK but demonstrates the types of issues that can arise while 
managing a burgeoning crisis, raising questions about NATO’s preparation for a biological 
incident. For instance, NATO may or may not be equipped to support a future incident, which 
could be remedied by allies agreeing to pool medical and personnel resources. As for operational 
concerns, it is unclear whether NATO has an official plan describing how it intends to respond to 
an attack should there be a broader threat to allied countries. NATO centers dedicated to biodefense 
maintain rapid testing and detection methods, which can be used in a scenario like that of the 
Skripals, but there is no published material suggesting NATO intends to respond as a unit on the 
ground to a larger threat.94 
The COVID-19 Pandemic 
Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, NATO was slow to formulate an overarching strategy 
for combatting the spread of the disease, but unity and plans have steadily strengthened. With the 
first outbreaks in 2020, there was little NATO solidarity. Data demonstrates that a total of 48 
measures were taken internationally to support Italy with their severe outbreak, of which only 7 
were directed by NATO.95 China, on the other hand, outperformed NATO with 13 actions of 
solidarity. For example, China sent 3.5 million masks to Italy early in the crisis, compared to 
330,000 from NATO, highlighting the strength of Chinese “mask diplomacy” compared to 
NATO’s emergency preparations. This information may represent a lack of cooperation as states 
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prepared their own response, a lack of solidarity as an alliance, or a lack of preparedness for 
response to a biological threat. Furthermore, NATO countries eventually joined the global call to 
action and have since set up a trust fund for and donated crucial medical supplies to NATO and 
non-NATO states alike. Medical resource pooling highlights the international cooperation 
necessary to successfully combat any biothreat, including naturally-occurring pandemics, and 
suggests individual states retain capabilities to respond to a biological threat, though their 
deployment may be sluggish.  
 Finally, amidst the burgeoning pandemic, NATO adjusted plans for the Defender 20 
exercise tasked with practicing the deployment of 20,000 US soldiers and related actions. Despite 
increasing public health concerns that encouraged social distancing, the exercise continued on a 
pared-down level. Allies cut numerous linked exercises and minimized the number of troops 
deployed.96 As for on-the-ground regulations, troops were required to abide by host nation public 
health guidelines, but NATO did not propose an allied position on key regulations.97 NATO did 
not plan a unified response for matters such as whether or not troops would be required to wear 
masks, an issue infused with domestic controversy for states such as the US. The exercises took 
place in Europe and therefore mask regulation may fall on the EU, but the combination of multi-
national forces from states within and outside the EU deems the question a NATO issue as well. 
Mask-wearing exposed a flaw in coordination issues on a larger scale when paired with issues such 
as disorganized travel bans, challenging the strength of alliance unity and interest in coordinating 
responses on an international level. The COVID-19 pandemic does not represent an urgent military 
threat that required NATO to quickly deploy, but raises questions about the ability to respond to a 
military threat with a biological threat raging. 
 
Where Russia Stands 
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 The modern Russian biothreat compounds issues arising from the Soviet era with the 
technologies and scientific advances of the 21st century to create complex issues ranging from 
assassination to biosafety. By considering the program and military doctrine that produced the new 
Russian state, this section will analyze the current threat on various levels and test how they apply 
to NATO.  
The Soviet Union: First Program (1890-1970) 
 Russia’s experience with BW programs began in the early 20th century with a peaceful 
program to fight naturally occurring threats. Like many other countries, Russia eagerly explored 
the rising field of bacteriology, setting up the Imperial Institute of Experimental Medicine in 1890 
to research vaccines.98 Between 1890 and the end of WWI, the Russians experienced severe 
disease outbreaks, especially typhus, with deaths exceeding those from the Sino-Japanese War, 
WWI, and the civil war in 1918 combined, reinforcing the importance of perfecting biological 
defenses.99 By 1928, the Soviets launched their first offensive and defense BW programs to study 
weaponization of specific agents or decontamination methods and vaccine development, 
respectively.  
The Soviet BW infrastructure continued to grow until WWII when German forces invaded 
the Soviet Union in 1941, forcing Soviet weaponeers to evacuate their facilities and flee. There are 
numerous alleged uses of BW during the German invasion of the Soviet Union. As the Germans 
were about to capture Moscow, soldiers suddenly fell ill with tularemia, a disease commonly found 
in Eastern Europe that causes flu-like symptoms, ulcers, enlarged spleen and liver, and in serious 
cases pneumonia.100 Soviet BW leaders have claimed the outbreak was caused intentionally, 
though limited evidence to this claim exists. Whether or not the outbreak was an intentional attack 
 
98 Anthony Rimmington, “Origins,” in Stalin's Secret Weapon: the Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare (London, 
UK: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers), 2018), pp. 13-37. 
99 Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Soviet Union's First-Generation Biological Warfare Program, 1926-1972,” in The 
Soviet Biological Weapons Program and Its Legacy in Today's Russia (Washington, DC: National Defense 
University Press, 2016), pp. 5-18. 




or a natural outbreak is unknown, but nonetheless the outbreak served as a hit to the German forces 
that may have prevented them from capturing Moscow. This incident demonstrates the military 
importance of biodefense for manmade and natural events. Moreover, the Soviets are believed to 
have deployed a sabotage team in Ukraine during WWII to purposefully spread typhus among 
German camp guards, potentially killing as many as 120.101 After the war, the Soviet program 
shifted to focus on matching the West’s BW capabilities. This early phase program continued until 
the 1960s, when it began to deteriorate due to focus on nuclear weapons and a lack of scientific 
advancement following a state-sponsored campaign enforcing false science that stunted growth in 
the life sciences.102 
The Soviet Union: Second Program (1970-1992) 
 The Soviets reinvigorated their BW program in the 1970s following major advances in 
genetic engineering despite having just committed to the BWC. Specifically, scientists were able 
to gain funding and approval from the government by promising that genetic engineering could 
provide them with new BW with antibiotic or vaccine resistance, which offered a significant 
military advantage. Furthermore, the Soviet military reinforced the false belief that the US still 
maintained a secret BW program, thereby ensuring state support. However, the new program was 
launched while negotiating the BWC, requiring any offensive activities to compartmentalize to 
prevent security leaks. To maintain secrecy, the Soviets created Biopreparat, a massive 
organization working under the guise of a civilian pharmaceutical company to develop and 
produce next-generation BW. Biopreparat served as the central hub for the offensive BW program 
and was run by Dr. Ken Alibek, formerly Kanatjan Alibekov, as the deputy chief, who defected to 
the US in 1992 and proved an invaluable intelligence source. Until 1992, the US and Western 
allies knew nearly nothing regarding the expansive program. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, President Boris Yeltsin acknowledged the expansive Soviet BW program and pledged to 
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dismantle it completely. Despite his best efforts, there was significant resistance from the military. 
Instead of cooperating with Yeltsin, military leaders refused orders, hijacked committees tasked 
with shutting down facilities, and used false intelligence of an offensive US program as an 
argument to keep theirs.103 
The Soviet Union and Russia: Modern Insinuations (1992-2021) 
 As of 2020, there is no publicly available information regarding the status of Russia’s BW 
program over the past 30 years. Russia has participated in confidence-building measures (CBMs) 
and international disarmament measures, suggesting they have terminated the program and 
destroyed any stockpiled weapons. However, their disclosed information does not match US 
intelligence gathered from HUMINT sources, suggesting they did not fully reveal the extent of the 
program through CBMs. Furthermore, they refuse to allow international scientists to visit facilities 
and maintain extreme secrecy, lack of transparency, and ambiguity in reports. 
Development of Soviet Biological Weapons Doctrine 
 Repeatedly, decisions to continue and strengthen an offensive program were made on the 
basis of US and Allied capabilities. During the 1960-70s, Soviet leadership relied on the 
‘correlation of forces,’ or assessments of the military, economic, and foreign policy power of other 
countries compared to the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders believed the correlation of forces favored 
the US over the Soviet Union, suggesting they held greater power and were more likely to succeed 
in a conflict. Also in this period, President Nixon’s decision to renounce the American offensive 
BW program triggered speculation among Soviet leaders that the US was secretly conducting 
offensive research. In the early 1990s, a team of Soviet scientists visited US laboratories as part of 
a confidence building measure, which they used as false evidence that the US maintained an 
offensive program. Combining long-standing distrust of the West with doctored evidence 
supporting their concerns, the Soviets were certain the US and its allies posed a significant 
biological threat.  
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 Soviet military doctrine demonstrates the intensive strategizing and paranoia directed 
towards the use of BW and provides insight into how Russia may invoke BW in a future conflict. 
Of the three levels of warfare, tactical, operational, and strategic, Soviet BW focused mostly on 
operational and strategic level of warfare, assuming limited tactical relevance. Historically, 
strategists considered BW as a tool for causing mass chaos and weakening enemies during battle, 
but drifted away from this perception as difficulties with precision targeting of enemy troops 
mounted. On the operational level, Soviet bio-weaponeers prepared weapons capable of 
incapacitating the enemy and their ability to make war, specifically by sickening soldiers, 
reinforcements, and individuals involved in fueling war efforts via supply chains. Without the 
ability to restock or bring in more troops, the enemy was expected to weaken to a Soviet offensive. 
Other operational goals may have included capturing important facilities, air bases, or ports, where 
BW could be used to break down enemy defenses in these areas. As for strategic use, BW would 
have been deployed against surviving enemy populations after a nuclear strike. A 1981 US Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) report tabulated percentages of the US population that 
would be killed, severely injured, or relatively healthy following a nuclear strike and found 
approximately 37% would fall into the last category; Soviet BW aimed to instigate a contagion to 
wipe out or significantly weaken this remaining population.104  
 
 The Soviet Union’s doctrine for BW surrounded concerns about war with NATO.  
Two American researchers studying Soviet BW, Milton Leitenburg and Raymond Zilinskas, 
interviewed former Soviet officials and scientists to question the role of BW in Soviet military 
planning. They found three common answers: war against NATO, war against China, or no 
practical purpose. However, the latter two can be nixed. First, the authors refute war with China 
as a leading focus. Poor relations with China emerged in the late 1960s, but the Soviet program 
existed long before that, indicating a different target. Alternative theories argued Soviet BW were 
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not developed for the battlefield, but as a deterrent. Scientists arguing for this theory frequently 
returned to the issue of NATO or China when questioned, weakening the argument against 
battlefield use.105  
 In addition to interviews with involved scientists, research on the types of weapons 
developed indicates the intended use and supports the theory that Soviet doctrine was NATO-
centric. The Soviets gave extensive focus to strategic weapons, namely weaponized smallpox, after 
the relaunch of the program in 1972. Ken Alibek connects the increased focus on smallpox with 
the WHO’s official announcement that the virus had been eradicated as of 1977.106 Without a 
natural threat of smallpox, governments ended vaccine programs for the disease, leaving large 
swathes of NATO populations vulnerable to a Soviet attack. As an example of Soviet logic, 
smallpox could be utilized after a nuclear attack, where survivors would have weak medical 
infrastructure and be unable to rapidly produce smallpox vaccines. Without defenses, this type of 
attack could completely destroy the remaining populace if large portions were not already immune 
to the virus. Throughout the remainder of the program, the Soviets maintained large stockpiles and 
allegedly filled ICBMs with smallpox.107 Based on the classification of smallpox as a strategic 
weapon and the focus on ICBMs, Soviet military planners focused primarily on the US or a larger 
NATO threat. Significant controversy exists regarding whether or not ICBMs with BW were ever 
created, as sources on the biological side suggest they prepared agents for ICBMs, but those 
involved with the missiles claim there were never plans to use a BW-loaded ICBM. Regardless of 
the role of dissemination methods, the use of smallpox itself points to a Western enemy. Smallpox 
would not be an ideal weapon to use against China because an outbreak could easily spread over 
the shared border between China and the Soviet Union and endanger Soviets.108 NATO countries, 
though, were sufficiently distant to provide protection. The study fails to address the toll on 
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neighboring Warsaw Pact countries, but the Soviet Union could have ensured their safety through 
other methods such as vaccine and medical countermeasure availability.  
Does Russia Still Have Biological Weapons? 
 The Soviet Union’s offensive BW program as described existed from 1972 to 1992, when 
President Yeltsin banned further research and revealed the program to the world. However, based 
on his personal experience on an inspection trip in the US and observations he made following his 
defection, Alibek suggests the Russian offensive program, though not the weapons stockpiles, 
likely continues to exist.109 The former deputy chief of Biopreparat describes his experience 
inspecting four US facilities the Soviets believed were involved in an offensive American BW 
program as of 1991. Specifically, the Soviets visited the US Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in Maryland, a former BW and CW test site at Dugway Proving 
Ground in Utah, a former CW storage facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, and a Salk 
Institute vaccine plant in Pennsylvania. Alibek portrays the examined facilities as run down and 
discusses how other members of the inspection team desperately searched for evidence of any 
offensive activity without success, going to the lengths of checking above ceiling tiles for hidden 
proof. However, upon returning home in 1992 to the newly created Russia under President Yeltsin, 
military officials demanded the team provide a falsified report claiming the Americans developed 
offensive weapons in hopes of securing continued support for a continued Russian BW program. 
At this point, Alibek resigned and soon after defected to the US. This experience establishes the 
connection between Western capabilities and Russian intentions; even without proof that a 
biological threat existed, the Soviet and succeeding Russian military persistently fought to 
maintain their program despite no apparent threat. Though this incident occurred nearly 30 years 
ago, it is unclear if Yeltsin managed to overpower the military generals and many believe he failed, 
which would have lasting impacts on the state of a modern program.110 
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In addition to his personal experience with inspections, Alibek speculated on the existence 
of an offensive program in the early 2000s. While he believes it likely that Russia destroyed 
stockpiles of weapons, the infrastructure in place indicates ongoing R&D or ease of mobilization 
with dual-use technology. Multiple facilities are still controlled by the state and those that are not 
have contracts with the army. Moreover, in the 1990s, prominent facilities were still directed by 
Cold War leaders, when the program was supposedly transitioning to civilian work, some of whom 
were given military promotions, indicating continued leadership.111  
One such figure was General Valentin Yevstigneyev, who Alibek suggests continued to 
lead a high-level offensive facility. In a 1999 interview with a Russian security-focused NGO, 
General Yevstigneyev explained the fate of the Soviet BW program and highlighted their 
continued work on biological defenses for diseases such as Hepatitis B. Alibek reasserts the ease 
of transitioning between a civilian and military facility because of dual-use technology. To this 
point, General Yevstigneyev is asked about the timeframe needed to complete this transition if 
Russia wished to revert to mass production. He stresses the importance of genetic engineering in 
providing efficient weapons with “minimal investment,” implying the infrastructure and 
knowledge for offensive weapons exists and therefore Russia could mobilize quickly. Considering 
Alibek’s claims in context of General Yevstigneyev’s insinuations leads to the conclusion that it 
is possible Russia maintained the capability to carry out offensive activities despite Yeltsin’s order 
to end offensive programs.112  
When questioned about the offensive BW program, General Yevstigneyev focuses on the 
stocks of potential BW pathogens that Russia legally maintains and their potential for 
weaponization, as well as some historical tests and operational munitions. Despite his candor 
relating to previous offensive tests and weapons, one interesting diversion implies Russian 
intention to develop BW, especially without inhibition from international influence.113 
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Yevstigneyev: We pose no threat to anyone and there are no traces of our BW offensive program. We 
can be suspected solely on the basis of intention. 
Interviewer: What do you mean by 'intention'? 
Yevstigneyev: We still have no final agreement with the West on what to call biological weapons, what 
equipment and technology should be regarded as potentially capable of BW production, or what should 
be banned under future Conventions. As to the level of information transparency about current activities 
of our laboratories required by foreign inspectors, no solution has been found yet. 
Furthermore, through stating “there are no traces of our BW offensive program,” General 
Yevstigneyev implies there could be a hidden program. Throughout the interview, he campaigns 
for a Soviet-style program based on the belief that the military alone can protect the populace from 
an impending threat. Considering President Yeltsin’s weak control over the military and the 
Generals’ significant power, if the military wished to keep an offensive program, they likely would 
have found a way. Alibek believes the Generals converted any offensive programs to defensive in 
name only, leaving BW development and research unscathed. However, as inspections have never 
been allowed in Russia despite confidence-building measures, official proof does not exist. 
Putin’s Biological Aspirations 
In an essay published during the 2012 presidential election, Putin recommends the 
production of genetic weapons because they “will be more acceptable in terms of political and 
military ideology.”114 Presumably, genetic weapons refer to weapons targeting individuals based 
on their ethnicity or genetic traits. Putin also expects genetic weapons to rival nuclear weapons in 
their strength, warning that they will be highly dangerous, yet the idea that they will be ‘more 
acceptable’ suggests he views these weapons as an alternative that could be practically employed 
in a conflict with less international blowback. The BWC should cover any possible genetic weapon 
due to a clause asserting that provisions in the Convention apply to new and upcoming 
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technologies, but Russia may disagree as to whether or not it is valid with a completely new 
weapon type. Regardless, whether or not Russia would abide by the BWC’s ruling is unclear.  
In concept, genetic weapons seek to target individuals based on their DNA, which may or 
may not pose a threat to NATO. The primary concern regarding genetic weapons would be their 
ability to target individuals of a specific race or ethnicity, providing the tools necessary for ethnic 
cleansing or advanced eugenics. However, NATO benefits from the fact that NATO-country 
Europeans are genetically incredibly similar to ethnic Russians, denying them genes to target 
without traits exclusively found in non-Russian Europeans. If Russia chose to employ such a 
weapon, they would risk sickening their own population, decreasingly the likelihood and overall 
risk of a genetic weapons attack. Even so, Russia’s bold decision to research and potentially 
develop genetic weapons highlights the weakness of the BWC and the perils of modern 
biotechnology when applied to weapons development, proving a greater danger to NATO. 
Poisonings – a One Off or a Pattern? 
Despite the Soviet Union’s focus on BW as a strategic or operational weapon, modern 
Russia’s behavior raises questions of other potential uses. In recent decades, Russia carried out 
multiple attacks involving CBRN weapons. In 2006, a former state security (FSB) agent residing 
in the UK, Alexander Litvinenko, was assassinated using the radiological material polonium-210. 
The murder has been connected to an FSB and an ex-KGB officer.115 Polonium-210 is a 
radiological weapon, which are generally considered WMDs, though the international limitations 
on them do not ban usage but rather bar states from supporting proliferation. As for chemical 
weapons, Russia has carried out two high-profile assassination attempts in 2018 and 2020, 
targeting former KGB agent Sergei Skripal in the UK and political dissident Alexei Navalny.116 
Both individuals were poisoned with Novichok despite Russia being a signatory to the CWC and 
claiming to have destroyed all CW stockpiles as of 2017. In the biological realm, the Soviet Union 
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aided the Bulgarian intelligence service in assassinating prominent dissident and journalist Georgi 
Markov using ricin, a biotoxin isolated from the castor oil plant.117 Interestingly, this murder used 
an umbrella to shoot a capsule of ricin into the victim’s leg. This device was developed by the 
Soviet Union and their involvement in that attack has since been confirmed through defecting 
Soviet intelligence agents.  
As discussed, the Soviet Union and feasibly Russia primarily devote their BW program 
towards strategic or operational capabilities; however, numerous important understandings are 
found by examining the instances where Russia or the Soviet Union employed CBRN weapons as 
tools for assassination. First, it is abundantly clear that Russia frequently ignores international 
treaty obligations, including the BWC and CWC. The BWC designates ricin as an illegal toxin, 
but the KGB still used it in the Markov assassination. CW have been used twice in assassination 
attempts. Second, Russia shows little concern for international disapproval. Following the Skripal 
assassination attempt, the US and its allies approved expansive sanctions with the condition that 
they cannot be revoked without Russian assurances to cease all illegal activity and allowing 
inspectors to confirm treaty compliance. Even so, Russia attempted to kill Navalny just two years 
later, demonstrating the limited effect of economic levers and international disapproval on Russian 
behavior. This lack of concern suggests Russia does not fear Western actions or feel as though 
they can be held accountable. Finally, Russia has become less careful with their assassination 
efforts, which if expanded to include BW, could present a serious risk of contagion. The Skripal 
case validated this concern when assassins improperly disposed of remaining Novichok, which 
eventually contaminated other unrelated objects and led to the death of one and severe illness of 
another innocent British citizen. In a case involving a pathogenic BW, the weapon could self-
replicate and infect uninvolved individuals at random, broadening the impact of an assassination 
from targeted state enemies or public officials to the general populace. The circumstances 
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highlighted vary from a BW assassination attempt, they suggest Russia could pose a significant 
threat in small-scale attacks in addition to a strategic or operational level of war.  
Russia and International Accountability 
The core issue of the security dilemma stems from not understanding an enemy’s 
capabilities and therefore overestimating the necessary defenses, sending off a spiral of insecurity 
and arms races. In the growing liberal international system, arms treaties target this insecurity by 
establishing mutual assurances to limit such destabilizing behavior. However, in order for states 
to successfully pursue security through treaties, they must trust that the system will find and root 
out bad actors who seek to disrupt a secure environment. The fact that Russia shows little respect 
for the international system exposes weakness in the BWC, but more importantly, wields the power 
to cause international insecurity.  
The Soviet Union held a crucial role in negotiating the BWC, yet demonstrated blatant 
disregard for its provisions by simultaneously reinvigorating an offensive program. Modern Russia 
follows this pattern, questioning the value of multilateral arms control measures between Russia 
and NATO. The BWC was signed by the Soviet Union in 1972, but was partially invalidated before 
entering into force in 1975 because of Soviet proliferation efforts. With the advent of genetic 
engineering, Soviet bio-weaponeers revived the dying BW program around 1972. The program 
went undetected for years and only was fully revealed by President Yeltsin in 1992, stupefying 
Western intelligence services. Furthermore, confidence-building measures with Russia have been 
unsuccessful.118 Russian scientists toured US facilities in the 1990s, but have not opened to 
inspections themselves. This flaw demonstrates a key weakness in the BWC, as there is no protocol 
for accusing a state of maintaining a BW program or inspecting claims. Without faith that Russia 
holds up the BWC or protocols to ensure their faithfulness to the treaty requirements, the BWC is 
largely spineless. Furthermore, Russian actions risk worsening the international security climate; 
other states cannot trust Russia to uphold its obligations, leaving states vulnerable to attack. When 
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states feel vulnerable, they are likely to seek arms and thereby propagate the security dilemma. In 
the European context, Russia may or may not pose a biological threat, but without any evidence 
suggesting they are innocent NATO countries cannot define their vulnerabilities and fine-tune the 
specific defenses they must build. This insecurity could be bypassed with simple inspections of 
Russian facilities, but without them, NATO must continue to view Russia as a viable BW threat. 
Russian Scientists and Proliferation 
After decades cultivating the skills, knowledge, and infrastructure to organize a lethal BW 
program, the collapse of the Soviet Union presented a new proliferation concern that their bio-
weaponeers’ tacit knowledge or infrastructure may be used by other international actors. Recently, 
states have increasingly worried over the threat of terrorists using BW. Production would require 
an advanced understanding of scientific methods but one would only need basic, widely-available 
supplies. The Soviet Union exemplifies this concern. As the Russian government began to cut 
spending on BW programs in the 1990s, the relatively autonomous branches of the program began 
to sell services and potential weapons on the black market. They even went so far as agreeing to 
sell Iraq an industrial fermenter, a key piece of equipment for weapons production.119 The 
fermenter could not have peaceful applications based on Iraq’s life science industry and was 
certainly intended to produce BW. Individual scientists were sought out for their services – Ken 
Alibek recalls being approached by South Korea, France, and Israel to lead biodefense research 
and knew of others who worked for North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.  
Biosafety in Russia 
In 1979, a BW facility at Sverdlovsk that produced anthrax accidentally leaked the 
pathogen into the city air without noticing the failure for hours. According to Alibek, a filter in an 
exhaust pipe needed to be replaced, a routine fix, but the employee working failed to note the 
defective filter before finishing his shift. Once the production machines were turned on, anthrax 
spread throughout the city and sickened hundreds, killing somewhere between 100 and 1000 
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people. The catastrophe at Sverdlovsk was helpful for Western intelligence services as it provided 
evidence that a Soviet BW program existed. While the event may have only impacted Russians 
and did not create an international issue, it demonstrates how easily a mass casualty event could 
occur with BW. If Russia maintains their program and conducts research on dangerous pathogens, 
a simple mistake could launch the next pandemic with the risk to spill over into other states. 
Genetic engineering amplifies this risk, as Russian research likely examines applications of genetic 
engineering to produce superbugs that are highly contagious or antibiotic-resistant. Without 
inspections or international regulations, it is difficult to predict what precautions Russian 
laboratories or production plants take, leaving the possibility for simple mistakes to cause mass 
casualty events globally.120  
Disinformation 
Generic disinformation represents one of the largest challenges facing NATO, but also 
exists in the realm of BW. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union invented and spread false stories 
of US BW development and deployment. These falsehoods accused the US of producing and 
accidentally disseminating HIV, researching weapons to target specific ethnic minorities, and 
releasing numerous diseases throughout Central America. More recently, Russia, along with other 
actors such as China and Iran, has produced disinformation suggesting the US purposefully created 
the natural virus responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic. These accusations, while directly 
lobbed at the US, seek to damage the West’s credibility as a whole, endangering NATO’s 
international relationships as foreign governments begin to question their actions and involvement 
due to fear from false information. 121 
Disinformation poses a unique threat to NATO because of the impact it may have on 
deteriorating norms and international law. As false stories of Western BW are constructed and 
accepted as truth, countries may feel emboldened to skirt international law to research and develop 
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their own BW programs, heightening a biological security dilemma. International norms rely on 
the public holding their leaders accountable for taboo behavior, but if they believe falsehoods that 
the US and other Western countries are arming with BW, they may be less inclined to argue against 
weapons development on moral grounds. Regardless of the mechanism, disinformation inherently 
weakens resolve against BW and general international security, posing a significant risk to NATO 
without any strong methods for protection.  
 
The Gap Between Russia and NATO: Potential Threats 
The Intelligence Gap 
Though known issues exist with BW proliferation and there are numerous scenarios that 
can be drawn up to predict potential threats to NATO, definitive concerns cannot surface without 
proper intelligence; this is a longstanding issue with BW in general. Throughout the Cold War, 
NATO was mostly oblivious to Soviet threats. In the thirty years since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, NATO’s relationship with Russia has oscillated between aspiring for friendship and 
disagreeing on crucial international matters such as the war in Ukraine or Syria. In a period of 
distrust and tense relations, NATO must be warier of Russian capabilities and threats, but the 
extent to which NATO needs to be concerned remains uncertain without intelligence. While Russia 
may house a BW program with potential to threaten NATO, they may not harbor malicious 
intentions. Intelligence serves the crucial role of preventing an escalation based on unnecessary 
distrust if Russia does not have BW capabilities, but gives NATO the time and space to prepare 
defenses if necessary.  
As discussed, NATO’s current focus revolves around detection capabilities such as sensors, 
which can identify an imminent threat by sampling the air or water for known biological or 
chemical agents. However, relying on sensing serves as a reactionary effort, not a preventive 
defense because a threat found using sensors has already spread and must be contained after the 
population may have been exposed. COVID-19 provides a useful example. The pandemic proved 
a significant threat by January 2020, but lockdowns, mask mandates, and intensified sanitation 
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efforts did not emerge for months in many countries; this lag permitted the spread of the virus and 
exponential growth for months following. On a basic level, states could not respond to COVID-19 
because of mask, hand sanitizer, and medical equipment shortages. Importantly, there is no 
practical difference between a natural pandemic and a widespread BW attack. If preparations failed 
to handle COVID-19, there should be no reason to believe NATO is equipped with the supplies or 
protocols necessary to contain a BW attack, which could be worse than a natural pandemic if the 
agent has been genetically engineered.  
Building on the role of information in preparing for an attack, the danger of a BW attack 
depends on the specific agent used, immunity to an agent, and how it is employed, which can be 
mitigated using intelligence. In the face of an attack, little can be done to slow the spread to the 
extent of protecting the general populace without immunity or the capability to quickly mobilize 
vaccine development and distribution. However, with appropriate intelligence, a worried state 
could produce and stockpile vaccines or medical countermeasures to quickly respond to an 
outbreak. Biological threats are unique because each pathogen or toxin requires a different course 
of treatment, so intelligence plays a key role in helping states identify what medical 
countermeasures to develop to prepare a response to the specific threat. Lack of intelligence slows 
down a state’s response and defense efforts, so if NATO fails to seek up-to-date information on 
the state of Russia’s BW program, they inevitably risk the lives of citizens as they scramble to 
react only after an attack has occurred.  
On the Battlefield 
Despite limited information on Russian BW strategy, inferences from Soviet policy 
uncover potential strategic use of BW against NATO and therefore NATO weaknesses. As an 
operational weapon, Soviet strategy invoked BW as a tool to weaken an enemy in an armed conflict 
by halting supply lines and sickening soldiers. Applied to the modern context, operational use 
would imply a conventional war between Russia and NATO countries. Based on geographical 
confines and contemporary politics, such a war would likely occur in Eastern Europe, as a 
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continuation of the current Ukrainian conflict or a new issue in the Baltics. Ukraine currently is a 
NATO partner but not an official member. While they have sought membership, entry into the 
alliance is unlikely in the near future, especially due to the ongoing ground war with Russia 
following the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Regardless, NATO continues to show significant 
concern over the conflict and steadfastly supports Ukraine through verbal, material, and financial 
support. As we enter the seventh year of this conflict, Russia may consider use of a BW if they 
wished to break the stalemate. By employing a BW, Russia could advance deeper into Ukraine 
and gain control of vital natural resources, such as a monopoly on Ukrainian gas. 
In recent years, NATO countries contributed financially to the Ukrainian effort and trained 
Ukrainian forces to fight against Russia; with such a background, it is difficult to imagine a 
situation where NATO does not involve itself should a biological conflict occur. For example, 
NATO states could provide anything from basic supplies and medical countermeasures to 
protection equipment and reinforcements. Furthermore, NATO maintains units trained specifically 
to counter CBRN threats through detection, surveillance, diagnostics, and containment, which 
could be shared with a struggling Ukraine. Finally, NATO indicated a willingness to share advisors 
and experts with a member state in need, which may apply to Ukraine during a biological incident. 
Ukraine currently only connects with NATO due to long-term cooperation and collaboration, but 
NATO does now include states sharing borders with Russia, increasing the threat of a biological 
attack through a conventional attack.  
The Baltic states and Poland have deep history with Russia and the Soviet Union, leading 
to Russian concerns of NATO involvement in their backyard. Again, in an operational conflict, 
NATO would be poised to support defense efforts through providing supplies and offering 
additional protection. It is unlikely, however, that Russia would instigate a conflict with directly 
NATO; a more realistic scenario could involve Russia accidentally releasing a BW they are 
researching and developing, which could spread to nearby states. Furthermore, NATO must 
prepare to contain a propagating BW threat, as the close proximity of states likely threatened by 
Russia to other NATO states would worsens the impact of an initial attack.  
 58 
 Operational use of BW primarily presents a threat to NATO militaries and war efforts and 
requires a strong biodefense response. The status of NATO biodefense sector remains uncertain, 
but publicly available information demonstrates a concerted focus on detection and surveillance 
capabilities. In a conventional conflict, advanced sensing technologies provide NATO the ability 
to catch a potential threat quickly, leading to a quicker response. As was demonstrated through the 
sluggish rollout of COVID regulatory efforts and lockdowns, a quick response can prevent spread 
of infectious disease, reducing a potentially catastrophic attack to a manageable one. Furthermore, 
sensing capabilities are practical to implement in conventional conflict because of the limited scale 
of their employment. However, surveillance methods only allow for rapid detection; NATO still 
must remain capable of rapidly responding. In an operational theater, NATO could expect BW to 
be utilized in a manner that primarily impacts troops. Therefore, troops need to have access to 
defenses against a quickly detected threat such as PPE or medical countermeasures, such as 
vaccinations to prevent infection or medications and treatments.  
Soviet doctrine designated strategic BW as a tool to wipe out populations surviving a 
nuclear strike or significantly overwhelm the medical infrastructure, weakening the state overall. 
Nonetheless, it is incredibly difficult to imagine a situation where modern Russia would resort to 
nuclear weapons in a conflict with NATO states due to NATO’s well-prepared and highly capable 
nuclear deterrent. Use of nuclear weapons would inevitably lead to a NATO retaliation on Russian 
territory. Moreover, strategic application of BW inherently seeks to attack the populace, whereas 
nuclear doctrine may only seek to damage NATO states’ military industrial complex with civilian 
casualties being a secondary consequence. The potential for a strategic BW attack remains low 
without any clear goal to attack civilians, which may provide some comfort to NATO states. 
Individual Uses 
With Russia repeatedly carrying out and supporting assassination attempts in NATO 
countries, it is possible this trend could evolve to target outside politicians and leaders. Russia’s 
brazen attitude towards crossing boundaries in their development and use of banned weapons 
suggests there is a possibility for use of a BW in assassinations. Though they have not yet targeted 
 59 
NATO-country leaders or public figures, the potential for a BW attack on such individuals exists. 
As demonstrated in the cases of Litvinenko and Skripal in the UK, CBRN weapons prove 
dangerous for small-scale use because of sloppy tradecraft endangering the broader public. If 
Russia were to target an individual in a NATO country with a pathogenic BW, unless extreme 
precaution was taken or the threat was detected quickly, it is probable that the isolated attack could 
launch a local public health crisis.  
The other potential use of a biological agent on a small scale could involve bioregulators 
or toxins. These are nonpathogenic and present less of a threat to the public but can provide more 
immediate effects and serve as better assassination tools. For example, use of a bioregulator that 
impacts blood pressure or heartbeat as a weapon could quickly cause respiratory and cardiac 
failure, leading to death within minutes. Bioregulators and toxins attack the body quickly and 
effectively, raising their value as an assassination weapon compared to slow-acting pathogens. The 
Soviet Union reportedly researched non-pathogenic BW such as toxins that could be produced in 
bacteria, creating a novel dissemination system. Additionally, as seen with the Markov 
assassination, the Soviets employed the toxin ricin to attack an individual, setting the stage for 
further use.  
The International Scene 
As demonstrated, Russia proves a legitimate threat to NATO in terms of BW use in a 
conflict. They also risk weakening international norms and the strength of international 
agreements, further endangering NATO to other actors. For decades, the Soviet Union modeled 
hegemonic power for states under their influence, which Russia has inherited. By choosing to 
flaunt international regulations against the proliferation of BW, Russia tacitly accepts other state 
and nonstate actors developing BW. Should broader proliferation occur, NATO could face a 
heightened risk for terrorist attacks, especially considering the increase of both domestic and anti-
West terror in recent decades. Once the technology and methods involved in BW production 
spread, the feasibility of their use increases and actors may choose to invest in the weapon after 
seeing others’ success. In general, NATO cannot negotiate with a nonstate actor effectively to 
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remove BW from the international scene, but they can work with Russia to prevent norm 
degradation from reaching the point where proliferation is tolerated. Moreover, Russia’s influence 
in the world exceeds just symbolic influence over likeminded states. Russia holds elevated 
positions in international fora, such as a permanent seat in the UNSC. With veto power, Russia 
could derail nonproliferation efforts touted by NATO. This possibility becomes more likely when 
considering the mindset Russia holds towards NATO and BW: they firmly believe the West still 
maintains BW programs secretly and wants sole control of the weapons to weaken Russia relative 
to their power. As long as Russia believes NATO possesses malicious intent in any efforts to rid 




1. Improve intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing 
 NATO can best assess the threat of Russian BW by reforming intelligence collection 
methods to more appropriately estimate the extent of the threat. Numerous issues exist within the 
current intelligence infrastructure that have previously allowed threats to slip through the cracks 
or be underestimated by passive analysts. NATO must find better methods to collect, analyze, and 
share intelligence that will support alliance-wide research and preparations. 
 At the state level, NATO states must strengthen intelligence collection methods to 
determine the potential adversary’s intentions; this requires more HUMINT or advanced 
surveillance. HUMINT has repeatedly proven the most fruitful method for collecting intelligence 
on BW because it uncovers perspectives on what the weapon’s intended use is, as well as the 
reasons behind weapons development. On a basic level, strengthening HUMINT requires finding 
new sources, which proves difficult as the most notorious sources in the past have involved high-
level defectors. For decades, NATO was unaware of the existence of numerous Soviet BW 
facilities because of intense regimes of secrecy. The covert nature of BW programs suggests that 
finding the perfect source will remain a barrier to effective HUMINT. Furthermore, improving 
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HUMINT presents a difficult challenge due to a source’s fear of retaliation, a valid concern 
following the recent CW attack on Sergei Skripal. To attract sources, states need to be creative in 
how they ensure the source’s safety. Despite the difficulty in tangibly changing HUMINT, states 
must provide this branch of intelligence with more resources. As for surveillance, NATO must 
find innovative ways to detect BW development in addition to just usage, supporting efforts to 
snuff out threats before they emerge. 
2. Revitalize research 
 Connecting to intelligence, NATO should expand its support for basic and applied 
scientific research to thoroughly understand the biology behind a BW in addition to just the 
military applications. NATO’s Science for Peace and Security encourages broad participation in 
scientific research, though it is unclear to what extent these programs divert resources and attention 
to BW. NATO needs to prioritize research as it relates to biological security, especially in wake of 
the COVID-19 pandemic that demonstrated NATO members’ inability to contain biological crises. 
NATO must gain a stronger understanding of BW science to practice applying these concepts to a 
military response. NATO vows to only conduct defensive work and to not employ an offensive 
weapon, but forces still need to train to master an appropriate response, whether containing a 
spreading pathogen or maintaining operational war capabilities during an attack. By conducting 
broad research to understand the nature of BW, NATO will be able to effectively plan for a wide 
range of threats and therefore productively manage a burgeoning crisis. 
3. Work with Russia to maximize preparations 
 Outside of the BWC and broader counter-CBRN actions in the UN, NATO has not directly 
worked with Russia to address concerns of BW. The BWC presents significant concern because 
of its systemic ineffectiveness and should remain a focus for future BW arms control, but NATO 
should work directly with Russia in other venues to directly address concerns of Russian BW. 
While Russia relies of secrecy and likely would not endanger their program through disclosing 
classified information, working with Russia to begin inspections in both NATO states and Russia 
may help NATO target defensive efforts. Even through understanding the types of scientific 
 62 
abilities Russian agencies or companies possess and the type of research they conduct, NATO can 
focus on improving defenses related to areas of actual concern instead of vague predictions. 
Previous inspection attempts have failed after Western countries allowed inspections by Russian 
teams but the effort was not reciprocated by Russia. To ensure cooperation, inspections could 
occur simultaneously and therefore prevent Russian cheating. For objectivity, NATO could request 
an external committee conduct inspections. Regardless, NATO must work with Russian under the 
assumption they will attempt to cheat, but accept any gains possible. The goal of rooting out the 
entirety of an offensive weapons program is not achievable, so it is necessary to shift expectations 
to consider any progress in negotiating directly with Russia a success.  
Furthermore, in working with Russia to address proliferation or use of BW, NATO must 
draw a line in the sand and invoke a clear doctrine demonstrating what NATO will and will not 
allow on the international scene. In recent years, Russia has become more reckless in their methods 
to handle state enemies. Specifically, they have recklessly carried out high-profile assassination 
attempts with weapons that can cause harmful effects to a community. When possible, NATO 
ensure that what actions they deem irrefutably unacceptable are abundantly clear as well as the 
consequences of crossing this line. Though all BW attacks are banned by the Geneva Protocol and 
the BWC and norms provide restraints on usage, NATO must clarify how they intend on 
responding to a threat to deter Russian aggression. For instance, overtly stating that assassination 
attempts in NATO countries with BW will result in significant consequences has the potential to 
constrain Russian aggression. Though this doctrine should not be negotiated, it is important that 
such concerns are vocalized between NATO and Russia to prevent future miscommunication or 
escalation.  
4. Prepare medical infrastructure and watch for the worst 
 The weak response to the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted that NATO countries are 
not capable of responding to an emergent biological threat. Though the pandemic occurred 
naturally and was not a manmade BW, the mechanisms and equipment needed to appropriately 
contain the threat are identical. In the event that NATO cannot successfully deter a Russian BW 
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attack or another incident mirrors the effects of a BW attack, NATO must quickly mobilize to 
deliver supplies, increase surveillance, and respond as necessary to the attack. Because the 
Alliance has numerous members with well-developed health infrastructure, NATO could consider 
building stockpiles of medical supplies to roll out to the impacted area quickly, supporting quick 
containment efforts. By increasing surveillance, members can react quickly once impacted by a 
BW and take necessary policy steps such as requiring lockdowns. On the public health side, states 
must be capable of responding quickly to effectively contain a BW, as pathogenic BW will 
replicate and spread rapidly, widening the disaster instead of fighting it. However, if Russia or 
another actor perpetrates a biological attack, NATO must prepare to respond on a military level to 
deter future usage of BW. Without a clear, pre-determined doctrine centered on biological warfare, 
NATO may falter in their response, reveal Alliance weakness and possibly alert other actors that 
they can perpetrate an attack on NATO soil. Therefore, preparations must include both material 
preparations to actively address the fallout from an attack as well as policy considerations to ensure 





Biological weapons are unique weapons with the ability to kill indiscriminately with 
power continuing to grow as modern biotechnology presents a potential bio-weaponeer with 
stronger, more efficient, and more discrete weapons. NATO remains vulnerable to a biological 
attack. NATO must address their unfocused direction, subpar intelligence, and inconsistent 
preparation. Russia’s ability in biotechnology, lack of commitment to international agreements, 
and hostile action throughout the continent makes this a significant security problem that must be 
addressed. To counter this threat, NATO must reform their current policies and procedures to 
focus on better intelligence and research, address weak international regulations, and prepare for 
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a biological incident, natural or manmade. The threat of biological weapons will grow in the 
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